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Making Stuff Up
Richard H. Underwoodt
Abstract
Beginning with an article in this Journal almost thirty years ago,
Professor Underwood continues to research andwrite about legal ethics
and litigation. In this Commentary, he offers a witty look at several cases
where, in his opinion, thejudge allowed improper arguments to thejury.
Introduction
Almost thirty years ago, as a new Assistant Professor, I published an
article in the American Journal ofTrial Advocacy.' My subject was trial
ethics or, if you will, "dirty tricks" in litigation. My thought was that it
might be helpful if new lawyers had "a primer on the more common
forms of cheating employed by trial lawyers... [together with some
suggested] antidotes that may be administered to curb ... abuses."2
Thirty years later that little article has turned into a textbook of over 700
pages, with a 250-page supplement.3
Of course, my project was hardly original. A technical manual on the
black arts of advocacy styled the Rhetorica Ad Herennium dates back as
far as the first century B.C.4 This treatise was used as a standard text on
rhetoric during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The work
addresses numerous subjects, including the mnemonic techniques used
by ancient orators to memorize their speeches.' It also catalogs the
I B.S. (1969), The Ohio State University; J.D. (1976), The Ohio State University
College of Law. Richard Underwood is the Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law at the
University of Kentucky College of Law.
'Richard H. Underwood, Adversary Ethics: More Dirty Tricks, 6 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 265 (1982).
Id. at 266.
WILLIAM FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY HANDBOOK: THE LIMITS OF ZEALOus ADVOCACY (2d ed. 2001) (originally
published as RIcHARD UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS (1988)).
4 CICERO, RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM vii (Harry Caplan trans., Loeb Classical
Library 1978) (1000 B.C.).
' The interested reader might enjoy FRANCES A. YATES, THE ART OF MEMORY
(1966).
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techniques or tricks of persuasion used by the ancients. We now call
many of these standard arguments fallacies of language, or fallacies of
informal logic.6 In another article in the Journal I provided illustrations
of how today's trial lawyers continue to employ fallacious arguments.7
My point is that collections of dirty tricks, while well intended, will not
lead to reform. Lawyers do not think about such things. Indeed, an early
reviewer ofmy proposal for a book on "trial ethics" pretty much summed
up the prevailing attitude:
What a coincidence! [Name omitted] was actually reading Underwood's
article on dirty tricks when my letter requesting his help arrived. In general,
[name omitted] is very keen on the [book] proposal, but he believes it must
be restructured if it is to appeal to practitioners: the focus must be on ethics
as a tool and a weapon.
In particular:
Underwood's article provides the model for the style of the book, and
"to hell with the more scholarly approach"; practitioners are only interested
in something they can use or "get screwed by!"'
Still, it is fun to collect, so I soldier on.
In this little Commentary, I am reporting on several new cases that
I encountered when I was updating my collection. In each case, a trial
judge allowed a lawyer to engage in what I think was clearly improper
argument.9 Now, you may say, this goes on all the time. Yes, it does,
but these arguments were bizarre, even breathtaking, leaving one to
ask--"What is going on out there?" But before examining these cases,
let's review some basics.
6 See NICHOLAS CAPALDI, THE ART OF DECEPTION (rev. ed. 2007) (1987); S.
MORRIS ENGEL, FALLACIES AND PITFALLS OF LANGUAGE: THE LANGUAGE TRAP
(1994); ANTONY FLEW, HOW TO THINK STRAIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL
REASONING (1977).
' Richard H. Underwood, Logic and the Common Law Trial, 18 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 151 (1994).
' These comments were written from my editor to me when he was reviewing my
proposal, in 1985, for the book, Trial Ethics. See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note
3.
' I have my own theory-that the trial judge is probably a former prosecutor.
Things follow from this, and I assume I do not need to spell these things out.
[Vol. 34:151
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What We Talk About in Legal Ethics
I have taught evidence law, trial practice and legal ethics for thirty
years, and based on my experience I suspect that law students have only
a limited understanding of what is and is not proper argument to the jury.
While there are exceptions,'I I have not seen much attention paid to the
subject in law school teaching materials, practice literature, or CLE
programs. This is so despite well established rules of "ethics." Consider
Model Rule 3.4(e), titled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel"":
A lawyer shall not.., in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying
as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or
innocence of an accused. 2
There is a lot of "trial law"' 3 in this rule. There should be no mis-
stating of evidence, reference to extrarecord facts, misuse of evidentiary
rulings, no personal opinion or belief or lawyer testimony in the argu-
ment, no misstatement of the decision-making criteria or mention of
improper criteria, and no appeals to sympathy, passion or prejudice. 4
All of this is, in theory if not in practice, backed up by the general "rule"
that "a lawyer shall not... knowingly disobey an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal."' 5
In practice, these rules are honored in the breach. While objections
are frequently made when counsel refers to or relies on "facts not in
evidence," trial judges are, more likely than not, going to move on after
'o See JACOB STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENTS (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2009).
" Now, there is a concept!
12 ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2007); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 107 (2000).
," I strongly recommend that students and practitioners alike read and keep closely
at hand: J. Alexander Tanford, An Introduction to Trial Law, 51 MO. L. REV. 623
(1986).
,4 See FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 13.
,5 ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2007); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 105 (2000).
2010]
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muttering some vague incantation like "counsel's argument is not
evidence," or "the jury will have to remember what the evidence is," or
a petulant "let's move on, get on with it."
As a state chairman of a Model Rules Committee-a Committee
charged with reviewing and making recommendations on the adoption
or amendment of the ABA Model Rules-I recall receiving a hostile
reaction to Rule 3.4. Many members of the audience thought that we
were engaged in an all-out and radical attack on the adversary system.
"How can you advocate if you can't tell the jury your personal opinion?"
and so on. It did not matter that the same rules, word for word, had been
included in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which had suppos-
edly been in effect for years. 6 Oh well, professors "are not real lawyers
anyway," and "those who can't do teach." 7 "You don't live in the real
world." Let's get a taste of what goes on in the "real world."'"
16 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C)(1 )-(7) (1980).
"7 My (hopefully funny) adventures and frustrations as an ethics chairman are
recounted in more than one writing. See Richard H. Underwood, Confessions of an
Ethics Chairman, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 125 (1991); Richard H. Underwood, What I Think
I Have Learned About Legal Ethics, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 245 (2003). When my Model
Rules Committee proposed that Kentucky adopt the Model Rules, we were hammered
(even by one of my Committee members, who had not raised any objection before the
Committee) for suggesting that a lawyer had an obligation to disclose directly adverse
law in the controlling jurisdiction, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2)
(2007), despite the fact that that was the current rule under the Kentucky Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that we suggested that a lawyer had an obligation to
report the misconduct of other lawyers-a duty imposed under the prevailing Code and
imposed on law students under our law school honor code. Some members of the
audience, including a member of the Supreme Court (sitting on our panel in front of the
audience) referred to the rule contemptuously as the "snitch rule."
"8 Things have not changed much over time. Here is a funny little historical anec-
dote from Joseph Baldwin, describing the antics of "fictional" Kentucky lawyer Cave
Burton:
[H]e was for "jurying" everything, and allowing the jury-the apostolic twelve as
he was want to call them-a very free exercise of their privileges .... He liked a
free swing at them. He had no idea of being interrupted on presumed misstate-
ments, or out-of-the-record revelations: he liked to be communicative when he was
speaking to them, and was not stingy with any little scraps of gossip. Or hearsay,
or neighborhood reports, which he had been able to pick up concerning the matter
at hand or the parties. He was fond too, of giving his personal assurances and
solemn asservations of personal belief or knowledge of facts and law.
JOSEPH BALDWIN, THE FLUSH TIMES OF ALABAMA AND MISSISSIPPI 113 (reprinted in
1957).
[Vol. 34:151
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Let's Make Up Some Stuff
How interesting can a "slip and fall case" be? In this case, pretty
interesting. 9 For one thing, a law professor was allowed to sit on the
jury. It happens!2" A plaintiffs verdict for $876,000 was reversed on
appeal, in part because of alleged jury misconduct by the professor
foreperson.2 I will not discuss the law professor part, although I do savor
the opportunity to indulge in a little professional Schadenfreude.22
Joyce Barber sued alleging that she slipped and fell while looking for
pantyhose in the defendant's store." She testified at the trial that she did
not see anything on the floor before or after her fall, but the bottom of
her pants were wet after the fall.24 Needless to say the complaint alleged
that the defendant was negligent in failing to maintain or inspect the
premises. However, things got complicated from the start. Plaintiff s
counsel made a number of assertions in his opening statement along the
lines of-the store did not keep records of inspections of the floor; the
store could not say when it last inspected the floor because there were
no records; records would have shown when the floor was last inspected;
"we've asked for those records [and not gotten them, was the implica-
tion]."26 The defense objected to these and other statements, but the court
glossed over the matter, simply instructing the plaintiffs counsel to
"move on" and that objections would be heard later.27 At the close of the
" See Barber v. ShopRite of Englewood & Assocs., 966 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2009).
2 I have served on juries in criminal cases. In one, the defense lawyer left me on
a jury-and also accepted a former Assistant United States Attorney (and a Repub-
lican!). Yes, the "real world" is a strange place.
2 Barber, 966 A.2d at 107-08. I think the court's discussion of the alleged jury
misconduct (if there was any, and if it was properly considered) was unnecessary to the
decision, since the plaintiff's lawyer's conduct justified a new trial; but you can read
the opinion for yourself.
22 This term is defined as "enjoyment obtained from the troubles of others."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1110 (11 th ed. 2003).
23 Barber, 966 A.2d at 97.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
2010]
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plaintiffs opening defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Among other
grounds, the
[defense] argued that plaintiff improperly framed the opening to suggest that
defendant failed to keep records it was obliged to keep [without proof of
industry standards requiring such record keeping] and failed to provide them
to plaintiff, implying that defendant either "got rid of them" or somehow
destroyed "some kind of evidence."28
The judge denied the motion for a mistrial29 and delivered some not
particularly enlightening admonitions to the jury.30 Now for the plain-
tiffs case-in-chief.
The plaintiff continued on the same theme. Russell Tyndall, a
ShopRite field manager was called.3 He had been in the store on the day
of the fall, and he testified that walk-though inspections were done at the
store five times a day-and he had no reason to believe inspections were
not done that day.32 He was asked whether the store kept records of
"leaks or spills" and when he said it did not, counsel produced a
"Wakefern corporate form" and without laying any foundation asked the
witness what it was.33 The witness did not know. The court did not rule
on a defense objection, but instead repeated counsel's question about
whether there was any record on inspections preceding the fall.34 The
witness indicated that a spiral notebook was used to log anything that
needed to be logged, but also stated that the Wakefern form was not
used.35 The judge said "Okay. That's the end of that," but issued no
admonition regarding the references to the form.36 Plaintiffs counsel
then moved on to suggest that there were "clear baby splash colognes in
28 Id. at 97-98.
29 Id. at 108.
30 See id. at 98-99.
11 Id. at 99.
32 Id.
33 Barber, 966 A.2d at 99.
34 Id.
35 id.
36 Id.
[Vol. 34:151
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38that aisle" where the fall occurred." The witness could not say.
Counsel then produced a bottle from his briefcase and, over objection,
suggested that "PRM Slash Cologne" was across the aisle from the
pantyhose plaintiff was looking for.39 Again, the witness had no idea.4"
The witness could recall that the only liquid on the floor was a few drops
of water from an umbrella plaintiff had placed in her shopping cart.4
During his closing argument plaintiffs counsel argued that water
"dissipates," and that the fall "happened to be [near] ... the baby bath
and shampoo, the baby splash cologne."42 Defense counsel objected that
reference to the splash cologne was improper without an adequate foun-
dation, but the court simply said "no" and let the argument continue.43
Again the argument returned to the theme of the opening statement, that
inspection reports did not exist: "Maybe they don't. Maybe a big store
like this doesn't have records."44 Then plaintiffs counsel referred to a
videotape of the plaintiff lying on the floor, which had been shown to the
jury at the beginning of plaintiffs case in chief, without any foundation
testimony about it.45 (Those pesky foundations and technicalities!)
Counsel suggested that the defendant would destroy the videotape: "I'll
look at all this before anybody has a chance to erase that tape. No. No,
I'm not going to do that. Credibility. It's a key in this case."46 When
defense counsel objected to the implication that non-existent records may
have existed but that defendant failed to produce the nonexistent records,
the judge declined to rule.47 Observing that the Wakefern form was not
relevant to the case, the judge still overruled the objection on that piece
37Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 99-100.
40 Id at 100.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Barber, 966 A.2d at 100.
44 Id
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 101.
20101
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of evidence, and with respect to another objection, told defense counsel
that he was "being too sensitive. ' 8
In reversing the jury verdict for the plaintiff, the appellate court
opined:
Here, our review of the record has convinced us that plaintiff's counsel
persisted "in making unwarranted prejudicial appeals to [the]jury" and that
the trial court did not adequately respond to defendant's objections to cause
plaintiff's counsel to change his trial strategy .... [T]he court allowed
plaintiff's counsel to question Tyndall on the baby splash cologne without
any foundation and without even establishing that the product was carried
by the store at the time of the accident. Similarly, the court allowed plain-
tiffs counsel to question Tyndall on the Wakefern document without any
foundation. In neither instance did the court instruct the jury to disregard
the questions and draw no inferences therefrom.
The court allowed plaintiff's counsel to imply repeatedly that defendant
failed to maintain and/or produce spill inspection records, without establish-
ing whether industry standards required maintenance of such records,
whether specific records were requested or whether there had been any pre-
trial motions to compel discovery of such records.
We need not consider whether each error standing alone would warrant
reversal because we are satisfied in the aggregate, the numerous errors
recited.., deprived defendant of a fair trial.49
"Imagine"
If you like the song by John Lennon,50 good for you--different strokes
for different folks. Just do not sing it to me during your closing argu-
ment. If I hear my opponent say "Let's imagine... ," I am going to be
on my feet objecting.
Mack Whittenburg was driving his pickup on a highway when he
collided with a stalled tractor-trailer, and suffered a number of serious
injuries, for which ajury awarded him $3.2 million.5 The appellate court
48 Id.
41 Id. at 106-07. For the reversal of a $30 million verdict, in part because of an
argument referring to spoliation and cover-up, unsupported by the evidence, and
advanced contrary to a prior ruling ofthe court, see Harris v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center,
116 Ohio St. 3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5587, 876 N.E.2d 1201.
so JOHN LENNON, IMAGINE (Apple Records 1971).
s' Whittenburg v. Werner Enters., 561 F.3d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 2009).
[Vol. 34:151
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reversed because of an improper closing argument. 2 In the argument
his counsel asked the jury to "imagine" with him that shortly after Mr.
Whittenburg left his house the night of the accident, the defendant truck-
ing company, Werner Enterprises, delivered a letter to Whittenburg's
children. 3 Counsel proceeded to read the imaginary letter to the jury.54
It contained imaginary admissions-made-up stuff-never actually
uttered by the defendants, and contained "vituperative and unprovoked
attacks on defendants and their counsel."" This made-up letter consumed
over half of the plaintiff s summation. 6 The defendants objected-"[t]his
is no comment on any evidence we've heard in this case" 57-but the
judge overruled the objection and granted counsel a continuing objection.
The appellate court reprinted the offending argument verbatim, and it
takes up three pages of the opinion." The court proceeded with its analy-
sis:
Counsel conjured a letter written by Werner to [the plaintiff's children]
notifying them for the first time of the news of their father's accident. Thejury was then presented with a detailed and fabricated image about the
children receiving the letter, and was implicitly invited to place themselves
in the shoes of the children, with counsel repeatedly using phrases such as
"your dad" and the pronoun "you." Counsel then introduced a number of
invented admissions by Werner- admissions that [the driver] was "inexperi-
enced" and "too confused to read road signs;" and that [the driver's trainer
who was with the driver] was "to tired to properly supervise her" and was
in a "blue funk;" that the two drivers together -rather than "taking a little
extra time" to find a "safe place" to turn around---"ignore[d] the law" and
"ignore[d] company procedures" to "recklessly set a trap" for [the plaintiff];
and that the drivers did so "so they don't have to answer.., for the delay
and downtime" and so [the supervisor] didn't have to explain why he
allowed [the driver] to "execute an improper maneuver."
Before us, the parties fight considerably over the propriety of ever using
an imaginary letter as a way to structure a closing argument. But we need
not resolve today an abstract debate over the proper form of closing
2Id. at 1133.
5Id. at 1124.
54 Id. at 1127.
11 Id. at 1124.
16Id. at 1127.
57 Id.
18 Id. at 1125-27.
2010]
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arguments because in this case there is a more pressing problem. Even
assuming the possible propriety of this technique generally, the content of
this particular imagined letter included a great many facts about Mr.
Whittenburg's children and Werner's conduct that lacked any basis in the
evidence adduced at trial. Counsel's argument accordingly violated the
cardinal rule of closing argument: that counsel must confine comments to
evidence in the record and to reasonable inferences from that evidence ....
The invented facts placed before the jury were also plainly calculated
to arouse its sympathy, evoking, as they did, images of plaintiff's children
receiving for the first time news of their father's injuries, implicitly asking
the jury to place themselves in the shoes of the children, and portraying
Werner as repeatedly admitting to reckless conduct. What's more, as these
admissions were couched in terms of Werner planning future actions to harm
Mr. Whittenburg, the closing argument at least subtly, if not overtly, placed
before the jury the suggestion that Werner acted with a degree of calculated
intentional malevolence-a suggestion that had no foundation in this trial
on negligence ....
But these are not the only problems with counsel's argument ...
[C]ounsel went much further, devoting a quarter of his closing argument (14
paragraphs' worth) -to vituperative attacks on defendants and their counsel
-attacks that likewise had no basis in evidence adduced at trial. Counsel's
imagined letter is littered with putative confessions from Werner that it
improperly took this case to trial; . . . that it purposefully mounted an
improper and dishonest defense in which it unfairly ridiculed Mr. Whitten-
burg, presented a one-sided view of the evidence, "forced" and "subjected"
Mr. Whittenburg to a trial, and used "smoke and mirrors and half truths" in
order "to try and shift the jury's focus away from the real issue in this
case."
59
Here again, as in the preceding case, the appellate court faulted the
trial court for simply overruling defense counsel's objections without
taking any curative action, which "could only have left [the jury] with
the impression that they might properly be influenced by [the improper
appeal] in rendering their verdict."6 Imagine that!
'9 Id. at 1128-29; see also Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391(Mich. 2004) (in a sexual harassment action, rhetorical aim of making defendant's
German ownership an issue, with repeated attempts to equate plaintiff with a Holocaust
victim); cf Powell v. St. John Hosp., 614 N.W.2d 666 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(relentless attacks on defense counsel and assignment of blame to defense counsel for
defendant's alleged misdeeds); Badalamenti v. William Beaumont Hospital-Troy, 602
N.W.2d 854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (attacks with no basis in fact that defendants and
their witnesses were engaged in conspiracy, collusion and perjury; appeal to jurors as
taxpayers).
60 Whittenburg, 561 F.3d at 1131.
(Vol. 34:151
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Let's "Channel"
Many odd ideas are passed on in CLE presentations. I have a vague
memory of attending one program years ago in which a lawyer was
holding forth on his use of "Day in the Life Films." The film he showed
had all kinds of objectionable sound and fury in it. I wondered if he had
actually used the film as shown, and how many attendees actually thought
that the presentation was proper. How things get started!
"Channeling the victim," a technique in which the lawyer speaks in
the voice of the victim in a criminal6 or civil case, got the attention of
the popular press during John Kerry's run for the Presidency in 2004.62
His running mate, John Edwards, was said to have used the technique in
at least one medical negligence case in which the parents of a child, born
with cerebral palsy, hired Edwards to sue on the theory that a Cesarian-
section would have prevented the child's injuries.63 During his summa-
tion he pretended to be the child speaking through him:
She said at 3, "I'm fine." She said at 4, "I'm having a little trouble, but I'm
doing O.K." Five, she said, "I'm having problems." At 5:30, she said "I
need out." She speaks to you through me.... And I have to tell you right
now-I didn't plan to talk about this-right now I feel her. I feel her
presence. She's inside of me, and she's talking to you.'
Edwards reportedly got a $6.5 million verdict.65 Permissible rhetoric or
improper argument? Is a little okay-but not too much? Did anyone
object? Consider the following case.
6' For a particularly bizarre performance, see Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 711
(9th Cir. 2000) (during closing argument the prosecutor took the witness stand in the
role of the victim and delivered a soliloquy in the victim's voice; this risked manipu-
lation and misstatement of the evidence and inflaming the passions and prejudices of
the jurors).
62 See generally Adam Liptak & Michael Moss, In Trial Work, Edwards Left a
Trademark, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2004/01/31/politics/campaign/31EDWA.html?pagewanted=all; Ann Coulter, John
Edwards: The Candidate Some DeadBabies Speak Through, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV.,
July 11, 2004, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s_202515
.html.
63 See Liptak & Moss, supra note 62.
Id.; see Coulter, supra note 62.
6S See Liptak & Moss, supra note 62; Coulter, supra note 62.
2010]
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In a recent Montana case, Amy Heidt brought an action against Dr.
Faranak Argani and her employer, the Deaconess Billings Clinic, alleging
that the doctor's medical negligence had led to the death of her husband,
Gerald Heidt.66
On the fifth day of trial Heidt's attorney presented his closing argument to
the jury. Most of the argument was delivered as a first-person narrative by
Heidt's attorney who assumed the persona of Heidt's deceased husband to
recount the events leading to his death. On appeal Heidt's attorney describes
his presentation as "[c]hanneling... as though he was the decedent." After
an extended closing, Heidt's attorney began to "channel" a description of
the death of Heidt's husband, using phrases such as: "Then, oh my God, I'm
dying." He then began describing being autopsied, including a description
of being cut open and of his sorrow at not getting to see his children grow
up.
67
The opinion does not state whether objections were made to this argu-
ment. (Is this made up testimony about irrelevant matters-the autopsy--
not directed at passion and prejudice?68) But the issue on appeal was not
the propriety of "channeling the victim. '69 The verdict was for the defen-
dant, and the plaintiff was seeking a new trial.7 ° Why?
[The channeling about the autopsy] got to be more than some could bear.
One of the jurors announced that she was "not okay" and that she thought
she was going to pass out. She attempted to leave the jury box and the court
called a recess. The remaining jurors were taken to another room, and the
ill juror was assisted into the jury room. She was attended by the defendant
[Dr. Argani], by Heidt's co-counsel Hammond, who is also a physician, and,
with the District Court's permission, by three other jurors who were also
nurses. Emergency medical personnel were summoned and tookthe ill juror
to the hospital. Dr. Argani was with the ill juror for approximately fifteen
to twenty minutes.7'
After the parties reconvened without the jury, plaintiffs counsel
moved for a mistrial, on the theory that Dr. Argani's attending to the ill
66 Heidt v. Argani, 214 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Mont. 2009).
67 1d. at 1257.
68 See id
69 See id.
70 id.
71 Id.
[Vol. 34:151
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juror was an irregularity that could prevent a fair trial.72 The trial judge
admonished the jury not to allow the events to effect their verdict, and
asked the jurors whether they could set aside what happened and render
a fair verdict.73 None of the jurors expressed any problem.74 The motion
for a mistrial was denied, an alternate juror was seated, and closing argu-
ments were completed.75 The jury returned a verdict for the defendant.76
The appellate court reversed the verdict and ordered a new trial.77
Make the jury sick and get a new trial! As I said before, the "real world"
is a strange place.
72 See id
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Heidt, 214 P.3d at 1259-60.
2010]
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